Institutional economics and policy

• The Role of Political and Economic Institutions in Rural Strategy Formulation and Implementation. This is a 55-page study commissioned by the Rural Development Division of the World Bank of how an institutional approach to economic policy objectives could illuminate problems of policy delivery in developing countries. The approach is based on a transaction cost model of government decision processes with emphasis on alternative institutional arrangements. Three case studies are discussed, viz. European milk policy; NZ wheat marketing policy; and the delivery of World Bank services to Kenya.

• Reforming EU Farm Policy: Lessons from New Zealand (PDF). Occasional Paper 112, Institute of Economic Affairs, London.
  This 32-page essay was designed to make the case for further deregulation of the Common Agricultural Policy in a more international market direction. It demonstrates how a small agriculturally exporting economy like New Zealand can retreat from a fairly highly regulated environment to a more open economy in the space of 10 years. There were some pains of adjustment and Government help was required at crucial times. The implications for trade reform are discussed in a final chapter. In a book of the same title, published by the IEA, my essay is followed by a commmentary by Richard Howarth, an IEA commentator. The link is in pdf format.

• Institutions and Policy Analysis (Rwmj2000d) This 14-page paper discusses how the transaction cost model of government decision processes might be applied in democratic societies with examples from marketing boards in Australia and NZ. Different institutional models are considered in the policy formation process in government institutions; these evaluations are not normally found in the public domain.

• The Role of Institutions in Policy Formation and Delivery. This 23-page paper, an invited paper at the Berlin 2000 Conference of the International Association of Agricultural Economists (IAAE), uses the transaction cost model of policy formation and delivery to illuminate the impact of institutions on economic policy making. Particular emphasis is given to the role of transaction costs in international coordination between institutions, and the influence of institutional reform on the provision of government services to the agricultural sector.

• An abstract of discussion group proceedings at IAAE meeting in Berlin in August 2000 on Analysing Policy Delivery Systems.

• Further Reflections on Williamson. This 17-page paper was delivered to the Adelaide meeting of the Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society in January 2001. In the paper, I review the meanings given to transaction costs, bounded rationality and Williamson's feasibility test, particularly with application to governmental administrative structures. Examples are given of changes in governmental services in a number of countries inspired by institutional reasoning.

• Policy advice as a process; competency and evaluation issues. This essay is a contribution to a symposium organised by the Insitute of Policy Studies, Victoria University, Wellington. The symposium was concerned with evaluating the quality of policy advice given to Government. The essay, looking in particular at the New Zealand experience, examines whether the effectiveness of past policy measures has been successfully monitored and evaluated, and suggests provision be made for adequate monitoring and evaluation in the future.

• The Evaluation of Economic Policy. This paper was presented to the 2003 winter meeting of the NZ Association of Economists in Auckland, June 2003.It repeats the plea for more ex post evaluation of previous policy programmes and suggests that greater encouragement of evaluation work could be supported by CEOs and Ministers. A preliminary examination of techniques required and training involved is presented.

• Public Choice: Further thoughts on the relations between Government and its Advisors. Paper presented at 2004 Meeting of the Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society, Melbourne, February 10 - 13. Taking a public choice point of view, this paper examines the relationship between the political decision makers and the economic advisors in government departments, using New Zealand and Australian examples. The paper identifies continuing friction between the two groups and a trend to greater restriction on the views of the public service, not unrelated to the growth of ministerial advisors in both countries.