Paper presented at the New Zealand Branch, Australian Agricultural Economics Society seventeenth annual conference, University of Waikato, August 1992.

The Road to Rio: Reflections on the UNCED Summit

by Robin Johnson and Jim Sinner MAF Policy, Wellington⁽¹⁾

⁽¹⁾ Senior authorship is shared. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily the views of MAF Policy. The authors wish to thank Dr Peter Kettle of MAF Policy, a NZ delegate to UNCED, for observations and information he has provided.

Abstract

This paper takes a political economy view of the Earth Summit and discusses the problems it attempted to solve and the solutions it arrived at. The political economy approach is an attempt to describe a general framework that encompasses both economic and political phenomena. The testing of the framework lies in its success in explaining the events under discussion. In this case the Earth Summit is seen as a means to overcome the "free rider" problem, in order to achieve objectives in the interests of all countries.

Introduction

In 1972, the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment was held in Stockholm, representing the first major international meeting on the environment. In 1983 the UN General Assembly established the World Commission on the Environment and Development, chaired by Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland of Norway, to examine the state of the environment and development in the perspective of the year 2000 and beyond.

The report of the World Commission, Our Common Future, made it clear that there are risks in current rates and patterns of development, especially if replicated in developing countries. The recommendations of the Commission led to a decision by the General Assembly in December 1989 to hold a United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Brazil in June 1992. This became known as the Earth Summit.

Expectations were raised. Environmentalists saw the Earth Summit as the last great hope to save the planet from disaster. Developing countries, on the other hand, saw UNCED as a chance to raise the prominence of development on the international agenda and extract more financial assistance and debt relief in return for addressing environmental concerns of developed countries.

The Earth Summit was eventually held in Rio de Janeiro from June 3 to June 14 1992; many thousands of representatives and NGOs and the media attended; President Bush and over 100 other heads of state arrived and gave speeches; and finally everyone went home. From the initial high expectations, what was actually achieved?

Does the political economy model offer any help in this process? Many non-government organisations (NGOs) were consulted and expected to take part. The New Zealand country statement was being prepared as early as 1990 and went through several drafts as treatment of many issues was novel and, in certain cases, unacceptable to some. New Zealand had to ask what an individual country, especially one of its size, could do to influence the outcome?

The political economy view

The political economy model attempts to integrate economic structures and processes with socio-political phenomena. Changes in economic processes are linked to the structure and goals of the various participants in the economy and the influence of external power holders and dominant interest groups. In the context of an international negotiation like the Earth Summit there is a conflict between national policies and international policies, and between the rich and the poor, in the realms of development economics and environmental protection. The conflict raises questions about the international distribution of national income and the sharing of world natural resources. The resolution of conflict is sought in an international negotiation and commitment to a new course of action.

The model attempts to describe a more general theory of behaviour than the normal profit maximising objectives of entrepreneurs. It seeks to incorporate the behaviour of groups of people into economic theory and places considerable emphasis on full information and incentives to act in favour of the group interest. It includes government both as politicians and as bureaucrats; each seeking what is in their self interest as in public choice theory. It seeks to explain by descriptive techniques how policy outcomes are achieved and places considerable emphasis on the distribution of power.

Economic models tend to regard Government as a passive partner implementing recommendations which maximise social welfare subject to the pursuit of some non-economic objectives. Political economy models treat Government as endogenous, and policy emerges from the interaction of rational policy makers and trade-sensitive economic groups (Moore, 1990). The objective of intervention and the choice of policy instruments are explained within the model. MacLaren (1991) identifies two sub-models: one group is referred to as "the social concerns," "social insurance" or "self-willed Government" group, and the, other as "self-interest" or "clearing house government" group. The first group is permeated with the idea of social justice and the second by the idea of rational self-interest of policy makers. Politicians are assumed to choose policies in such a way as to maximise political support and re-election.

The two themes which best seem to suit the UNCED process are those analysing group behaviour and national self-interest. Individual nations enter the United Nations process with single and equal votes but soon appear to belong to various groups or blocs. Thus we have the G7, the G77, CANZ, North and South etc. In addition, non-government groups (NGOs) were also invited to the "summit" and were also consulted during the preparatory phase. Another "group" is the loose amalgam of middle class intellectuals who keep the conservation movement alive and growing mainly in developed countries. Groups are thus collections of like minded nations or people with common interests still pursuing their own goals either in the group or independently. They belong to MacLaren's social concern group.

National self-interest is the concern of the participating nations. Nations have to protect their own interests in the negotiations and form groups if they see advantage in it. In this scenario, politicians and bureaucrats tend to become merged, though not always, as disagreements within the US delegation demonstrated. While politicians are seen as acting to maximise votes, bureaucrats can be seen as a group who want jobs and sometimes power and prestige. Bureaucrats in national governments would have different interests than those with positions, or seeking positions, in the United Nations organisations.

In terms of economic processes, the UNCED proposals raise costs for some nations, or reduce their access to resources, and impose taxes on others to help compensate the first group for what are seen to be inherent disadvantages (except where exploitation was the original reason for the disadvantage). In effect, income distribution is the underlying problem and gets reflected in debate about burden-sharing, protecting existing standards of living, official development assistance, property rights, and tropical forests etc.

The preparatory process: great expectations

Mr Maurice Strong, the secretary general of UNCED, visited Wellington in November 1991. He described the meeting of world leaders in Brazil as a chance to write a "Magna Carta for the Earth" setting the agenda into the next century. He said the Earth Summit must establish a whole new basis for relations between the rich and poor, North and South, and make a concerted attack on poverty as a central priority. This was seen as equally imperative for environmental security as it was in terms of moral and humanitarian endeavours. "We owe at least this much to future generations, from whom we have borrowed a fragile planet called Earth" (UN 1992b, MfE 1992).

On the question of future planning, the UNCED secretariat issued a statement saying "There will have to be extraordinary cooperation between Governments, NGOs, the private sector, the financial community, and other constituencies, to put the decisions of the Earth Summit into effect. The Rio Conference of 1992 will shape our collective future - and this will require an unprecedented effort on the part of the global community to translate its results into reality. While the Earth Summit will constitute a test of nations' willingness to institute fundamental changes in economic behaviour, the challenges ahead will be perhaps far more daunting. Change is seldom easy" (UN 1992b).

The UN General Assembly established a Preparatory Committee (Prepcom) open to all member nations. Prepcom met in Kenya in August 1990, in Geneva in March 1991, in Geneva in August 1991, and in New York in March 1992 (Prepcom IV). In terms of General Assembly Resolution 44/228, Prepcom was responsible for drafting the two centrepieces of the summit, the Earth Charter and Agenda 21 (UN 1992b). Prepcom was also responsible for negotiating a binding convention on forest principles.

The Earth Charter was to be a declaration of basic principles for the conduct of nations and peoples in respect of environment and development to ensure the future "viability and integrity of the Earth as a hospitable home for human and other forms of life" (UN 1992b). Agenda 21 is a programme of action for the period beyond 1992, citing issues to be addressed with "priorities, targets, cost estimates, modalities and assignment of responsibilities" (UN 1992b). The Conference was expected to discuss the means of implementing the agenda through new and additional financial resources, transfer of technology, and strengthening of institutional capacities and processes.

The Rio Conference was also expected to discuss and agree to binding conventions on specific areas of environmental concerns, namely climate change and biological diversity. These were the subject of separate parallel negotiations by governments, and were to be ready for signing at Rio.

Climate Change: In 1988 the General Assembly adopted a resolution recognizing climate change as a common concern. The UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the UN World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) then set up the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to investigate the potential severity and impact of global climate change and to suggest possible policy responses. In December 1990 the General Assembly set up the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (INC) supported by UNEP and WMO. Negotiations were to run parallel to the PrepCom process with the aim of producing a convention ready for signing by Governments at the Conference.

IPCC had noted in a report to the General Assembly in 1989 that existing legal instruments and institutions were insufficient and a frame work convention was desirable. Such a convention could produce specific targets and quantitative reductions that would be added as protocols to the original convention (UN 1992a).

Biological Diversity: UNEP first called on Governments to consider an international legal instrument for the conservation and rational use of biological diversity in 1987. UNEP then established an Ad Hoc Working Group of Experts on Biological Diversity, which held three sessions between November 1988 and July 1990. On the basis of the group's final report UNEP established a Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts to negotiate the convention, later becoming the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a convention on Biological Diversity (INC). The latter group met in Madrid in June 1991 and held its concluding session in Nairobi in May 1992 (UN 1992a).

The convention is meant to recognise the essential role of biological diversity in maintaining the life-sustaining systems of the biosphere, the significant reductions in biodiversity that are occurring as a result of human activities, and the urgent need to prevent and attack the causes of species and ecosystem loss at their source. It was hoped the convention would provide a mandate for integrating conservation and development objectives in government planning, and a mechanism for funding projects that combine the two in practice (WWF 1992). This raised a number of issues concerning the provision of financial aid to enable developing countries to implement the terms of the convention, questions of access to genetic materials and the sharing of profits from their future development, the use of new technologies in tropical forests, and the ownership and use of patent rights in the latter area (UN 1992a)

Forest Principles: Prior to the establishment of UNCED, the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) had initiated consultations on a possible international legal agreement on conservation of forests. Under UNCED, some parties sought an agreement that would ban the cutting of tropical rainforests. Developing countries responded by seeking to extend any agreement to include consideration of forests in temperate and boreal (northern) latitudes, where much of the forest had been cleared long ago, and hence was not such an issue. As a result of this broad disagreement, PrepCom proposed a set of principles for the sustainable management of global forests as a basis for post-Summit negotiations on an international legal agreement on forestry.

Thus the emphasis was to be on global management of forests without highlighting any particular countries or forest type. There was a need to recognise individuals countries sovereignty in such matters and there was seen to be a need for policies that redressed the external indebtedness of developing countries which depend on exploitation of their forest resources. The question was raised whether the cost of such programmes should be shared by the international community (UN 1992a).

The outcomes of the Earth Summit: failed expectations?

The Earth Charter, Agenda 21, and the three conventions were to be the foundation for addressing the world's ills. Some saw them as an environmental blueprint, a grand design. One New Zealand commentator said that UNCED would be for the environment what GATT is to trade, suggesting a set of binding rules or perhaps even uniform international standards. Even by Prepcom IV, in New York in February 1992, it was clear these high expectations would not and could not be met. Indeed, it is doubtful that the General Assembly ever envisaged such an outcome, but that did not prevent interested groups from stating their own expectations for UNCED.

The Rio Declaration

The Earth Charter was re-named the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and the vision of a "Magna Carta" was gone. PrepCom IV agreed to re-affmn the Stockholm Declaration, and call for a continued global partnership for sustainable development. The new Rio Declaration includes phraseology which can only be appreciated by repeating some of it here:

"States have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources...."

"Development must occur on a sustainable basis...."

"Eradicating poverty and reducing disparities in standards of living are indispensable.... "

"Developing countries shall be given special priority...."

"Developed countries should acknowledge the responsibilities they bear...."

"Countries should pursue appropriate demographic policies...."

"Trade policy measures for environmental purposes should not constitute a disguised restriction on international trade...."

"States should promote the internalisation of environmental costs...."

"The polluter should in principle bear the cost of pollution...."

These are but a sample from a statement with a preamble and 27 principles. The Declaration was largely completed at PrepCom IV but was subject to modification at Rio. Though the declaration is not legally binding, it is nevertheless aimed at giving Governments a strong moral commitment to adhere to its principles. However, once a consensus among all countries was reached, it seems the Declaration contains few principles that most governments would not already claim to be adhering to.

(2) As final texts have still not arrived from the United Nations at time of writing, the precise wording given here is not authoritative.

Agenda 21

By Prepcom IV, Agenda 21 had developed into a massive exercise in bureaucratic planning, describing literally hundreds of things that governments, international organisations, and NGOs "should do" to integrate the environment and development. The sheer volume of detail swamped any element of moral force, and required that Governments could only be expected to pick and choose those activities that were relevant and of high priority for their own circumstances.

Agenda 21 sets out, among other things, the financial and technical means by which specific action programmes are to be carried out. In particular this will mean identifying more effective help for developing countries to play their full part in meeting global challenges, while continuing their development in a environmentally sustainable way.

Agenda 21 is divided into four main sections:
I Social and Economic Dimensions;
II Conservation and Management of Resources for Development;
III Strengthening the Role of Major Groups IV Means of Implementation

The Chapter titles of sections I and II are given in Table 1.

Again the detail of this document prevents a full appreciation of its contents. Within Chapter 14 on sustainable agriculture there are 11 programme areas, such as "Land Resources Planning far Agriculture," and within each programme a number of components, as shown in Table 2. New Zealand's national interests in this chapter, as distinct from the collective global interest, principally lie in Programme A, dealing with agricultural policy.

New Zealand recognised that some of the relevant clauses could be interpreted in a way prejudicial to our interests. Our delegates were asked to ensure that the documents recognised the importance of trade liberalisation for alleviating poverty in poor countries, and that food security was defined as access to and ability to acquire food, rather than self-sufficiency.

At New Yark in March 1992, the New Zealand delegation successfully amended one phrase which encouraged government subsidies of agriculture, only to find the phrase still there when the results of Prepcom IV were circulated several weeks later. After many hours of work in the labyrinth of offices that was the UNCED Secretariat at Rio, and networking with sympathetic delegations, the NZ delegation succeeding in correcting the error. Such interventions illustrate how individual countries attempt to modify the wording in these international documents so that they do not come home to roost later!

Much of the rhetoric in Agenda 21 was familiar from FAO documents of recent years. What was new, perhaps, was the greater emphasis on environmental issues and the incorporation of these into a debate on development resources. The UN and FAO had visited most of the North-South issues previously and analysed the funding problems many times. What is new is the political rhetoric that goes with a large international meeting and the opportunity it provides to shift national positions, even if such shifts are slight.

Climate Change

The aim of this convention was to outline a set of general principles and obligations for international cooperation. Subsequent negotiations were to produce specific targets and quantitative restrictions on greenhouse gases, though this was contentious from the start. Before Rio, negotiations had already moved into detail of specific actions required, but disagreement on these issues had not been resolved.

The primary dispute concerned the setting of specific targets and timetables for reducing emissions of carbon dioxide, the leading greenhouse gas. Some countries supported a proposal to stabilise emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000. Others (primarily the United States) wanted voluntary adherence to this goal on the grounds that there was insufficient scientific evidence on climate change to warrant such strong action. In the end, the non-binding language was adopted to get all major nations to sign the convention.

Agreement also had to be reached on the control of emissions of other greenhouse gases, financial aid to developing countries; conditions to be attached to any such aid; payments to developing countries whose forests serve as global carbon "sinks"; and the terms by which environmentally sound technologies were to be made available to developing countries. (United Nations 1992a)

The framework convention itself is full of resounding phraseology and generalities. Interspersed in the text, however, are phrases with a heavier moral tone, eg:

"Greenhouse gas emissions have come primarily from developed countries, and these countries have the main responsibility for combating climate change.... "

"Developing country compliance with the convention will be dependent upon the effective implementation of the provisions on financial resources and technology transfer...."

"Developed countries should ensure efficient cooperation in technology transfer and technologies and know-how to developing countries on concessional, preferential and most favourable terms...."

Finally there was debate on, among other things, whether a new fund should be established under the convention or whether assistance for developing countries should be drawn from existing Official Development Assistance (ODA) funding arrangements. Along with this was the related issue of the right of donors to attach conditions to such aid.

Biological Diversity

The aim of the convention on biological diversity was to address plant and animal extinction worldwide. The biodiversity debate included a major focus on development, dealing with the maintenance of the world's stock of genetic resources for future use and development.

As with climate change, the debate on the convention was highly controversial, and many believed that the original intentions had been severely watered down by the time the draft convention reached Rio.

Again, liberal quotation helps to appreciate the sense of the convention (although precise wording is not confirmed pending receipt of final documents):

"States have the authority to determine access to their genetic resources but should facilitate access to genetic resources for environmentally sound uses on mutually agreed terms...."

"The countries benefiting most from biodiversity carry the main responsibility for the cost of its conservation...."

"States should adopt measures for the recovery and rehabilitation of endangered species and for their reintroduction into their native habitats...."

Again, there are clauses which give special preferences to developing countries and recognition to disadvantaged groups:

"Conservation of biodiversity and the sustainable use of biological resources require special funding for developing countries...."

"Practices and innovations developed by indigenous peoples which contribute to the sustainable use of biological resources and conservation of biodiversity should be recognised and rewarded...."

In the end, the United States objected to this kind of terminology and refused to sign. The US saw the convention as an open-ended commitment to share technology with developing countries, and providing insufficient protection to the interests of the US biotechnology industry. Other issues concern, again, the establishment of a new funding facility, that intellectual property rights could be threatened by the transfer of environmental technology to developing countries, and that vast profits are made from genetic material originating in the third world (WWF 1992).

Forest Principles

Several weeks before the Summit convened in Rio, it was clear that no consensus could be reached on a binding convention on protection of the world's forests. The aim of developed countries was to contain the cutting of tropical rain forests. Developing countries had responded by suggesting that the principles cover "all" forest situations. Again there were some statements which could be agreed upon and some that could not. The following statements were accepted:

"States have the sovereign and inalienable right to utilize, manage, and develop their forests in accordance with their development needs... on the basis of national policies consistent with sustainable development ... on a sustainable basis, including the conversion of such areas for other uses ... based on rational land-use policies."

"National forest policies should recognise and duly support the identity, culture, and rights of indigenous people, their communities and other communities and forest dwellers."

"Specific financial resources should be provided to developing countries with significant forest areas which establish programmes for the conservation of forests including protected natural forest areas."

In the following paragraph, the words in italics were added at Rio before the final agreement:

"Access to biological resources, including genetic material, shall be with due regard to the sovereign rights of the countries where the forests are located and to the sharing on mutually agreed terms of technology and profits from biotechnology products that are derived from these resources."

This amendment was made to reflect agreement on a contentious chapter of Agenda 21 dealing with terms for transfer of technology, and indicates the interrelationships between the different documents.

As with biodiversity, forestry has all the elements of the North-South debate of the last decade, focused all the more strongly because of the middle class reaction in the developed countries to further felling of tropical forest in Malaysia and Brazil.

Financial Resources

The secretary-general of the conference had estimated that the total foreign aid transfer implied by Agenda 21 was of the order of $US 125 billion per year (Garran 1992). This would be the level of assistance if donor countries increased their development assistance to an average of 0.7 per cent of gross domestic product, as compared with current levels of 0.35 per cent. Implicit in the move to this increased level of aid would be the establishment of several new funding mechanisms to meet such a target as well as existing mechanisms, such as the Global Environment Facility, the UN's International Development Association, Regional Development Banks, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO).

The conference produced agreement on a text that committed developed nations to more official development assistance (ODA):

"...countries reaffirm the UN target of 0.7 per cent of GDP for ODA, and agree to augment their programmes in order to reach the target...some countries agreed to reach the target by the year 2000...the Commission on Sustainable Development will review and monitor progress...."

Precise wording is unconfirmed pending receipt of final documents.

This implied support for a new Commission on Sustainable Development, which had been contentious. The secretary general announced donor pledges worth $US6-7 billion (NY Times 1992) though some doubt was expressed whether this was new money.

The political economy of UNCED: what happened?

To understand what happened to the grand designs of the originators and sponsors of the Earth Summit, one needs to consider the nature of multilateral negotiations and the pressures on the key players.

The "Earth Charter" ended up as the Rio Declaration because of a fundamental difference between North and South. The South wanted a statement that laid the responsibility for environmental degradation, and especially global warming, squarely at the feet of the rich nations of the North. Further, they wanted recognition that they had a right to develop their own resources, that the North had an obligation to provide assistance, and if the North wanted the environment to be protected more than it had been during the development of the North's economies, it would have to provide even more aid and live up to previous commitments.

While the North would accept some responsibility for environmental problems, it would not accept it all, and similarly rejected the strong moralistic wording suggested by developing countries. Many would have preferred stronger language on the duties of nations to protect the environment, and the problems of population growth, but the South was equally unwilling to accept moral directions from the North. The only solution was to adopt a Declaration largely filled with platitudes. Financial issues are discussed further below.

Agenda 21 fell victim to a different set of pressures. Those who envisaged a volume of environmental standards to be applied in every country clearly never had a chance. Protecting the environment for future generations is a luxury affordable only to those who do not have to worry about how they will survive until the next harvest. Not even developed country governments were willing to cede sovereignty on the broad range of environmental issues in Agenda 21, which were of tremendous political significance to their voters, especially when it was impossible to achieve the degree of protection in the South which Northern voters wanted.

Thus, Agenda 21 became a long list of projects to integrate development and environmental policies, many of the projects pulled out of the files by UN and FAO officials for whom these projects are bread, butter, and jam. It is easy to become cynical, let alone bored, reading page after page of activities to be undertaken by governments, drawing upon the expertise of these same officials and their co-workers, adding up to hundreds of billions of dollars per year.

Proponents of a strong climate change convention had to accept a much weaker version to get President Bush to sign. Facing a difficult re-election campaign, President Bush refused to support any commitments which could potentially hinder the recovery of the sluggish US economy. He suggested that limits on carbon dioxide emissions might have done precisely that, though it is hard to imagine how it could have impacted the American economy before the election in November 1992. The political economy model would suggest that Mr Bush perceived that, on balance, signing a convention with fixed targets would have cost him votes.

The biodiversity convention ran into the same obstacle, only this time the United States was completely isolated. The US claimed the convention jeopardised future growth, because industry had insufficient protection for the profits from new technology, but neither developing countries nor other developed countries shared this concern. The treaty was signed by 153 governments at Rio, but not the United States.

The negotiations on forests encountered similar difficulties, but now it was the developing countries which dug in their heels. For Malaysia and Indonesia, in particular, forestry is a major part of their economies, which they were not prepared to sacrifice in order to accommodate residents of wealthy countries where the forests had already been cleared. While Malaysia was the most vocal, one suspects many developing countries were sympathetic.

Overcoming the free rider problem

Given these entrenched interests, one might question the value of holding an international conference at all. This would overlook the visibility and pressure that such a conference can bring to bear on the issues, however. It is perhaps a tautology to say that multilateral conventions deal with global issues, but this was never more true than at UNCED. All governments and all peoples have a genuine interest in seeing the world make progress on resolving these issues, but they equally have an interest in bearing as little of the cost as possible. This is the classic free-rider problem so common in public sector economics.

By holding a high-profile summit, increased pressure can be brought to bear on those holding out and refusing to "pay their fair share." Prior to meeting in Rio, some governments expressed concern that the Earth Summit would become a "pledging conference" where world leaders would be expected to step to the podium and announce their country's contribution. In fact, this must be precisely what the organisers envisaged, for such dynamics are essential to overcome the free-rider problem. This was true for the binding conventions as well as for the issue of extra financial resources.

But for the dynamics to work, the organisers wanted President Bush to attend. Without him, the conference might have lacked the necessary visibility, and other countries would have felt less compelled to make financial contributions or cede sovereignty over certain policies if the United States would not do the same. Mr Bush realised that he was better off staying home than going to Rio to be criticised for refusing to sign anything or make any financial contribution. It was clear that those who did not measure up would be treated with scorn and painted as villains, at least for the duration of the conference.

Mr Bush agreed to attend the Summit when the mandatory targets were removed from the climate change convention, clearing the way for him to sign it. A few days before the Conference opened in Rio, he announced a forest initiative with the aim of "halting the loss of the world's forests by the end of the decade" (White House 1992). The US asked other nations to join in doubling financial assistance for forest protection. This was clearly intended to head off criticism that the US was not doing its part. But the US$150 million pledged by Mr Bush as a "down payment" failed to impress most observers.

And so no one got what they really wanted. President Bush attended, but was vilified all the same. Meanwhile, few commitments to new and additional financial assistance were made by governments.

Achievements

The treaty on biodiversity must be considered a success, and the Climate Change convention a limited success. The statement of forest principles is of more dubious value, unless negotiations continue to carry them into a binding convention. New Zealand, however, saw progress in the statement's recognition of the role that planted forests can play in meeting the world's need for timber products.

The Commission on Sustainable Development may prove a useful watchdog and brow-beater, if it can decide how to effectively monitor the implementation of a plan so unwieldy as Agenda 21. Otherwise it runs the risk of becoming another UN bureaucracy buried in paperwork.

Conclusions

The political economy model could certainly be developed further to describe the behaviour of the participants at the conference, in particular the common interests that led to bloc behaviour. The conference itself showed the political process working to finer and finer levels of decision making. Although a parallel conference was organised for NGOs, it appears that by reason of distance and then of urgency, the NGOs were largely shut out of the final decision making. In the end, it is governments which must negotiate the wording of documents they are asked to sign on behalf of their citizens.

But the common interest groups of nations remained paramount in the United Nations process, helped no doubt by procedures developed over many years. By and large, the issues at Rio were the same ones that dominated the international agenda for the past two or three decades, and the voting blocs that have developed over that time remained at the centre of the action. One development worth noting is the increasing prominence of the Pacific Island states on the issue of climate change.

The final documentation reflects what could be agreed at the lowest common denominator level between the developed nations or high standard of living nations and the less developed nations with a lower standard of living.

In the end, the Earth Summit was mostly about the environment, not about development, because the public in developed countries is interested in, and at least somewhat willing to pay for, action on the environment. Development aid is probably less popular than ever; witness the "America First" theme in the US presidential primary elections.

The Earth Summit had its successes. Many, however, will say that it was too little, too late. The challenge for those seeking action will be to channel the outcomes of Rio into concrete action by member states. On some issues, efforts will be best focussed at local and national governments, especially given the difficulty of negotiating international agreement, which the Earth Summit made all too clear. However, on truly global issues such as climate change, it will be necessary to continue building international consensus on action needed to solve the environmental problems of the planet Earth.

References

Garran, R (1992) "Third World digs in on environmental costs." Australian Financial Review. 9 June 1992.

Kettle, P (1992) "Report on United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Fourth Preparatory Committee". Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, Wellington.

MacLaren, D (1991) "Agriculture in the Uruguay Round: A Perspective from the Political Economy of Protectionism", Review of Marketing and Agricultural Economics, 59:87-92.

Ministry for the Environment (1992) "Basis for International Agreement." Environment Update. May.

Ministry of External Relations and Trade (1992) "UNCED '92: Information: Draft Outcomes" Volumes I and II.

Moore, M O (1990) "New Developments in the Political Economy of Protectionism" in C A Carter, A F McCalla and J A Sharples (eds), Imperfect Competition and Political Economy: the New Trade Theory in Agricultural Trade Research, Westview Press, Boulder 143-167.

New York Times (1992) "UN call to translate debate into action." Reprinted in Australian Financial Review, 16 June 1992.

United Nations (1992a) "Earth Summit: Press Summaries: Convention on Climate Change, Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio Declaration, Forest Principles" United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro.

United Nations (1992b) In Our Hands: Earth Summit '92. Earth Summit Publication No 2.

White House Office of the Press Secretary (1992) "Remarks by the President to Goddard Space Flight Center Employees." June 1, 1992.

World Wildlife Fund (1992) "Convention on Biological Diversity" News Sheet, May.